BIOPOWER

FOUCAULT AND BEYOND

EDITED BY VERNON W. CISNEY AND NICOLAE MORAR



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VERNON W. CISNEY
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CONTENTS

PART V : BIOPOWER TODAY

SEVENTEEN

Totalitarianism or Biopolitics? Concerning a Philosophical Interpretation of the Twentieth Century

ROBERTO ESPOSITO
TRANSLATED BY TIMOTHY CAMPBELL

A philosophical interpretation of the twentieth century: what does such an expression refer to, and what kind of weight do we want to give it? We could, of course, provide two different and in certain ways even opposing responses. The first is the one offered by the classic philosophical tradition of the twentieth century, which is to say the one supplied by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre (if we limit ourselves to only its most illustrious figures). For them the events of contemporary history are interpreted with a key supplied by philosophy itself, the only one available that might express what is essential for history. Whether the key is found in the crises of European sciences, in the unfolding of nihilism, or in the liberation of oppressed peoples—if we stick to the authors I have cited—in each case the twentieth century is understood according to the demands of a given philosophy whose task it is to make meaningful the events of the last century and to organize historical phenomena so that they move forward in an orderly fashion. A relation, therefore, is established between philosophy and history that is, so to speak, impositive. Only philosophy can impart an overarching sense to a series of facts that would otherwise be meaningless.

The first response, which produced analyses of monumental importance, is answered by another, one that overturns its logic. Rather than subordinating the movement of history to the logic of a given philosophy, it sees events as consisting of elements that are themselves philosophical. Meaning is no longer stamped on events from the outside, that is, from a point that coincides with the philosophical perspective of the person looking at the event. Instead this response focuses on how meaning originates and is constituted by the facts themselves—by their novelty, their

scope, and their effects. Perhaps this change in perspective can be felt as well in what the grand tradition of twentieth-century philosophy—from Heidegger to Wittgenstein, but also including Kojève—defined on the one hand as "the end of philosophy" and on the other as the "end of history." In reality, what came to an end was a way of seeing history as the object of philosophical reflection. From that point on, history was, so to speak, no longer the object but, if anything, the subject of philosophy. No longer the form of history, philosophy becomes its content.

If contemporary events enjoy a philosophical depth, then our task is no longer to supply a proper meaning to how history is composed but rather to attend to the meaning that is originally present in the events under examination. And this is not because history has a unique, preconceived meaning—which was precisely the pretext for all philosophies of history, were they progressive or regressive, ascending or descending—but rather because history is constituted by the intersection of a number of different vectors of meaning that compete with each other. Events charged with significance, such as the attack on the Twin Towers, are precisely those that invert previous meanings and instantly open up new horizons of sense. When we say that contemporary history is above all philosophical, we are not saying that contemporary history can be understood by using philosophy in contrast to the more reductive perspectives of economics, sociology, or political science (as suggested by Augusto Del Noce some years ago).[1] We are saying rather in a stronger sense that the decisive events of contemporary history—the world wars, the emergence of technology, globalization, and terrorism—are in themselves philosophical powers that struggle to control and dominate the world—or the predominant interpretation of the world and therefore of its ultimate meaning. This is why—even before oil, weapons, and democracy—the metaphysical stakes of conflict were fundamentally concerned in how we were going to define contemporary history.

I would now like to relate these two modalities for understanding contemporary history—that of the more traditional philosophy *of* history and that of history *as* philosophy—to two hermeneutic paradigms that are often confused and superimposed but that, in my view, emerge radically as mutually exclusive in their presuppositions and effects on meaning. I am speaking about the paradigms of totalitarianism and biopolitics. Despite attempts to bring them together in a framework that makes one the continuation or the confirmation of the other (in the sense of a biopolitical totalitarianism or a totalitarian biopolitics), we are really dealing with interpretive models that not only logically diverge but that are certain to exclude

each other. Their separation has less to do with their respective contents and more to do with a difference in approach that concerns precisely the relation between philosophy and history and the mode by which history is thought *by* or *within* philosophy.

In the totalitarian model, history is read and interpreted chronologically. It is traversed by an underlying break between two choices—between democracy and totalitarianism—that alternate. Thus the long phase of liberal democracy's general development is followed in the middle decades of the last century with a totalitarian period in both the West and the East; this period in turn is supplanted by two victories of the liberal-democratic model, a model that became hegemonic in the West in 1945 and 1989. What emerges, therefore, is that liberal democracy has both historical and philosophical traits. At the same time, however, modern history is situated along a vertical axis; first it ascends and advances and then, beginning in the 1920s, regresses until finally in the second half of the century it ascends again, despite the presence of new risks, some of which are linked to current developments in the Middle East. To these breaks on the vertical axis there corresponds on the horizontal axis a significant uniformity among forms, contents, and languages that are in fact profoundly dissimilar. I'm referring not only to Nazism and communism, fused in a single conceptual block, but also to liberalism and democracy, made homologous by the demands of a philosophy of history more inclined to assimilate them to each other than to differentiate between them.

That the totalitarian paradigm is born out of a traditional philosophy of history is demonstrated by the ongoing (and contradictory) recourse it has to the category of the origin. That this term appears in the title of two of the most important political works of the last century—Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* and Jacob Talmon's *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*—is not an accident; it is the clearest sign we have that totalitarianism may be a novel category but that its philosophical framework is absolutely classical.[2] In all the philosophical essays on totalitarianism, the interpretive gaze employed points to the origin but then struggles to find it. Where exactly is the origin of totalitarianism to be found, what produced it, and what is the principal basis for the absolute originality of twentieth-century totalitarianism? It is precisely here, in these demands made on the origin, that the first antinomy of the entire paradigm becomes apparent. How does one trace the genesis of the totalitarian phenomenon, which is also said to be, as Arendt herself argues, incapable of being assimilated to any other form of government and that therefore avoids any kind of causal genetic sequence? Why bother to find the origin of what does not seem

to have an origin? And then how are we to keep together what in principle is discontinuous, that is, what is absolutely new and at the same time continuous—which is to ask again: what derives from an origin?

Two possibilities present themselves, both of which are typical of philosophical historicism. The first, which is the one adopted by Arendt, traces the entire Western philosophical tradition back to an originary loss of the Greek polis. Here, then, all of subsequent history is condemned to a process of depoliticization, which is certain to merge with the antipolitical drift of totalitarianism. Thus, twentieth-century totalitarianism, understood as a dynamic and, what's more, as a logic, winds up appearing as the outcome—not necessarily decided beforehand but virtually so, given certain conditions—of a homogeneous logic found in modernity. It is true—we are still speaking of Arendt—that in her analysis an unexpected quickening is established between depoliticization and totalitarianism, which sets off their respective meanings, though they form part of the same trajectory. This quickening begins with Thomas Hobbes, whom Arendt awkwardly interprets as the philosopher who supplied political thought with all the assumptions for its racial theories, assumptions that would eventually lead to the abyss of Auschwitz and Kolyma. The other possibility, taken by Talmon (as by François Furet, though somewhat differently), consists in a search for the origin of totalitarianism within the same democratic tradition that it should be opposed to.[3] Here the meaning of totalitarianism is located in an originary disease *[malattia]* situated in the past, which when no longer found in Hobbes is traced to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and when no longer placed at the origin of modernity moves to the decisive event—the French Revolution. But here, too, the paradigm of totalitarianism remains imprisoned by a second antinomy it cannot escape: if the reference to the French Revolution—which is to say the most extreme form of democratic despotism, as Furet puts it—also holds true for communism, then how do we explain Nazism with reference to it?

Even Arendt's monumental essay is not spared these logical and historical difficulties. *The Origins of Totalitarianism* is divided in two. In the first section, we find the magisterial genealogical reconstruction of Nazi anti-Semitism, which dates back to the years of the war; the subsequent section is much weaker and is linked to the appearance of Stalinism (evidently conditioned by the Cold War). The reason for this imbalance, which can be traced empirically to the closing of the Soviet archives, really concerns, however, the critical point of the entire interpretive model, namely, the difficulty of locating the roots of Soviet communism in the same degenerative drift—from the crises of the nation-state, to colonial imperialism,

to the explosion of biological racism—that brought us Nazism. The question then is: how are we to hold together in a single categorical horizon a hypernaturalistic conception such as that of Nazism with the historicist paroxysm of communism? From a philosophical point of view, what does a theory of absolute equality—which is what communism at least in its principles purports to be—have to do with a theory and indeed a practice of absolute difference such as found in Nazism? A one-shaded drawing, based on the vertical opposition between the temporality of democracy and the temporality of totalitarianism, seems to carry the day over great logical, categorical, and linguistic caesurae, which in a complicated fashion extend across modern history in the paradigm of totalitarianism.

If Arendt's *Origins of Totalitarianism* remains a monumental work on Nazism, it is not surprising to find that on account of the logical and historical difficulties noted above, Raymond Aron, Talmon, and Furet will concern themselves instead with communism and only communism.[4] Aron in *Democracy and Totalitarianism* makes clear the reason for choosing to leave out (or having to choose to leave out) from his analysis the other pole of the totalitarian paradigm. What really interests him are only those regimes that profess to be democratic but that instead are practically derived from a perverse deviation from democracy. Both Talmon and Furet (but also Marcel Gauchet and Claude Lefort) agree with Aron; totalitarianism (of the Left, of course) is born from an infected rib of democracy and hence is a part of it.[5] Furthermore, the totalitarian regime does not arise out of a defect but rather from an excess, a surplus, of democracy, from a democracy so radical, so extreme and absolute, and so full of egalitarianism as to break down its own formal limits and so to collapse on itself, turning into its opposite. Communism—this is Gauchet's thesis—is instituted through a perverse inversion of the democratic model that distorts its features but is always based on the same suppositions. Communism is both democracy's dream and its nightmare. At this point, the chain of aporias of the entire totalitarian paradigm clearly emerges. In the first instance, if communism is not only situated on the conceptual horizon of democracy that emerges from the French Revolution but in a certain sense brings it to fulfillment in its excess of egalitarianism, how then can it withstand the distinction, fundamental to the entire discourse, between totalitarianism and democracy? How can totalitarianism be defined in opposition to what it originates from? In the second instance, if such an antinomic connection with democracy holds true for communism, certainly that cannot be the case for Nazism, which is ousted from the analytical framework of all these authors. But then the category of totalitarianism loses some of

its logical consistency. Already on shaky historical ground, totalitarianism stumbles on philosophical terrain, which had seemed to provide it with its last foothold.

Quite different from the paradigm of totalitarianism, biopolitics is not part of a philosophical presupposition, which is to say, it is derived not from any philosophical form of history but rather from concrete events—not only from facts but also from languages that make it comprehensible. Even before Foucault's analysis of biopolitics there was Nietzsche's genealogy and more precisely his deconstruction of the concept of origin—the origin that the theoreticians of totalitarianism searched for—which must be addressed to uncover the perspective of this new gaze.[6] If a full and absolute origin of the historical process cannot be said to exist—if the origin is never a unity, if it always splits and multiplies into many origins—then not only are such origins not definable—as Nietzsche himself explains, thus radically opposing all forms of philosophical historicism—but the entire historical event *[vicenda]* of the West is destined to assume features that are irreducible to the linearity of a single perspective. The global interpretation of modernity emerges here as profoundly altered. Every possibility of a unified reading of modernity comes to an end in favor of a frame traversed by horizontal and vertical breaks that make it difficult to presuppose continuity. Furthermore, note that what in the preceding paradigm is configured as a completely closed event in the specialist language of politics is now enlarged to include a more complex relation derived from the meeting, conflict, and layering with other disciplinary lexicons that interact and contaminate each other to create new and different effects. The appearance onstage of biological life—which anything but predisposes modern philosophy to a depoliticizing movement as in the Arendtian model—has a disruptive effect that then positions modern philosophy along different vectors of sense, which overlap without coming together in a single line. The force of the biopolitical perspective lies precisely in its capacity to read this interweaving and this conflict, this gap in meaning and what is implied, which is to say the powerful antinomy between intersecting languages that are originally heterogeneous, such as those of politics and biology. What happens when an outside—life—bursts into politics, thereby breaking apart its presumed autonomy, shifting discourse onto a terrain that is irreducible to traditional terms like "democracy," "power," and "ideology"?

This is the frame in which the phenomenon of Nazism is situated and where its radical heterogeneity ought to be interrogated. Without having recourse to more recent interpretations, Ernst Nolte, a witness who cannot be suspected of Gauchist sympathies, recognized the theoretical fallacy

of situating an ideology such as communism (however catastrophic in its political consequences) on the same lexical level with something like Nazism; under no circumstance can they be thought as belonging to the same category.[7] This is different from what Arendt thought. Nazism is not an ideology because it belongs to a dimension that is different from and subordinate to that of ideas, from which Marxist communism was born. Nazism is not a markedly different species within the same genus, namely that of totalitarianism, because it is situated outside Western tradition (a tradition that also includes the philosophy of communism among its offspring). It is counter to such a tradition, notwithstanding the differences between communism and liberalism (which fundamentally share a common reference to a universal idea of transcendence), that Nazism elaborates a radically different conception, one that no longer needs to be legitimated in any idea because it finds its essential foundation in its simple material force. It is not the contingent and necessary product of a history that defines the relation between men on the basis of their free decisions or, as communism holds, on the basis of their social conditions; rather it is based on an absolutely natural fact *[dato]* that concerns basic *[nuda]* aspects of biological life. To recognize in Nazism the singular attempt to free the natural features of existence from their historical peculiarity upends the Arendtian thesis of the totalitarian overlap between the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of history. It means instead seeing Arendt's blind spot—that these philosophies cannot be assimilated—and therefore recognizing the philosophical impracticability of the notion of totalitarianism.

Seen from the biopolitical perspective, the twentieth century and indeed the entire course of modernity is not determined or decided by the superficial and contradictory antithesis between totalitarianism and democracy but by that which is much more profound—because it pertains to the preservation of life—between history and nature and the historicization of nature and the naturalization of history. This antithesis is much more profound, I would say, because it is not ascribable to a symmetrical bipolarity from the moment that nature, understood in a biological sense, as Nazism understood it, becomes not an antihistory, or a philosophy, or an ideology that is opposed to history but more precisely a nonphilosophy and a nonideology. Nazism is not a political philosophy but a political biology, a politics of *[di]* life and a politics over *[su]* life transformed into its opposite and for that very reason productive of death. As Emmanuel Levinas wrote in the 1930s, in Nazism the biological, with all the fatality that inheres therein, becomes much more than an object of spiritual life; it becomes its core.[8] It is this immediately biological element of Nazism,

the thanatopolitical, regardless of the number of its victims, that makes the category of totalitarianism historically and theoretically unusable.

The question of biopolitics now moves increasingly front and center, in spite of those who mistakenly thought that the related disasters—one by explosion and the other by implosion—of what they referred to as totalitarianisms made possible a return to the old political lexicon that preceded it. Seen from this perspective, the end of the Second World War does not mark the victory of the alliance between democracy and communism on the level of language and material practice but that of a liberalism situated in the same biopolitical regime that, certainly inclined in an opposite direction, resulted in Nazism. In ways more unfamiliar than communism, Nazism emerges decisively defeated from the war both militarily and politically but less so either culturally or linguistically in the sense that the centrality of *bios* as object and subject of politics is reaffirmed, even if it has changed to reflect a liberal influence, namely, in that the appropriation and the possible modification of the body is not on the part of the state but on the part of the individual owner of himself.[9] If man for Nazism is his body and only his body, for liberalism, beginning with Locke, man is the possessor of his own body and therefore can use it, transform it, and sell it, as if the body were a slave. In this sense, liberalism—naturally I am speaking about the underlying category of liberalism—turns the Nazi perspective inside out, transferring the property of the body of the state to the individual, but within the same biopolitical lexicon. Yet it is precisely the biopolitical characterization of liberalism that separates it from democracy.

One could say, with an exaggeration that is not completely unjustified, that we cannot return to liberal democracy after the advent of so-called totalitarianisms because liberal democracy never really existed as such. Just as the assimilation between Nazism and communism in the category of totalitarianism is to be deconstructed, so too is the notion of liberal democracy to be problematized. The ideology of liberalism, in its logic, presuppositions, and conceptual language (antiegalitarian, particularist, and at times also naturalistic) if not opposed to the ideology of democracy is quite different; the latter tends to be universalist and egalitarian, as Carl Schmitt noted in his essay on parlamentarism and democracy.[10] If we stop ourselves from representing modernity as a historicist might, if we reject the idea of a chronological succession between liberal-democratic and totalitarian regimes in favor of a different genealogical or topological representation, we see that the correct and conceptually important distinction is not the vertical one between totalitarianism and liberal democracy but the horizontal and transversal one between democracy and communism

on one side—communism as the paroxysmal fulfillment of egalitarian democracy—and biopolitics on the other. Biopolitics in turn breaks off into two antithetical but not unrelated forms: Nazism, the biopolitics of the state, and liberalism, the biopolitics of the individual.

Foucault recognized the biopolitical character of liberalism, locating it on the level of the government of life, in opposition to or at least apart from the universalist procedures of democracy. Democracy—or anyway that which defines itself as such, which is to say that is founded on the primacy of abstract law and the equal rights of individuals who are endowed with reason and will—had already come to an end by the 1920s and 1930s. It is no longer capable of being reconstituted, let alone exported elsewhere. Naturally, if the democratic regime is reduced only to the presence of formal political parties in competition with one another and to the electoral method by which governing majorities are formed, one can always argue, as some do, that the number of democracies in the world continues to grow. But in doing so we lose sight of the radical transformation that swept across them, dragging them down into a semantic domain that cannot be reduced to what the concept of democracy requires as its precondition.

However, we should be careful. In arguing for this thesis, I am not referring to the dysfunctions, defects, limits, and contradictions that are implicit in all political forms, which are necessarily imperfect and incomplete. Rather I am speaking of a profound laceration of the same democratic horizon. This laceration becomes visible the moment we move from the level of form to the level of content, where content is understood as the material of the current biopolitical regime. It is true that democracy as such does not have contents; it is a technology *[tecnica]*, an ensemble of rules directed to distributing power proportionally according to the will of the electors. But it is precisely for this reason that it explodes or implodes; it takes in an element that it can no longer hold without changing into something radically different.

What we are dealing with here is the establishment of the biological life of individuals *[singoli]* and populations as fundamental to all of the most important political decisions of today. Of course, this does not mean that in the engagement and conflict between political forces other possibilities are not also at stake, concerning international relations and internal order, the model of economic development and the definition of civil rights. But the disruptive element with respect to the traditional democratic framework lies in the fact that each of these choices refers to the body of its citizens without mediation. If we consider only the recent example of Italy, where the laws that have chiefly involved the opinions of the public are those that

concern highway security, immigration, artificial insemination, and bans on smoking and drugs, we can begin to measure the direction of this paradigm shift; the model of medical care has become not only the privileged object but also the form itself of political life, which is to say a politics that finds its only possible basis of legitimacy in life. This is principally what happens when citizens are continually interpellated or objectively involved with regard to questions that pertain to the preservation of, the limits of, or what is to be excluded from their own bodies. But—and here is the decisive point—when the living or dying body becomes the symbolic and material epicenter of the dynamics of politics as well as its conflicts, we move into a dimension that lies not simply, as we sometimes hear, after or beyond democracy but resolutely outside it—not only removed from its procedures but from its language and conceptual apparatus. Democracy is always directed to a totality of equal subjects, given the fact that they are separated from their own bodies and therefore understood as pure logical atoms endowed with rational will.

This element of abstraction or disembodiment in democracy also echoes in the proposition that places the person at the center of democratic praxis, where *person* is understood, according to the originary meaning of the term, precisely as a disembodied subjectivity—as distinct from that totality of impulses, needs, and desires that are aggregated in the corporeal dimension.[11] When the biopolitical shift *[svolta]* that we are reconstructing takes place, this bodily dimension becomes the real interlocutor of government, at once subject and object. What is emphasized less is the principle of equality, which is inapplicable to something like the body, constituted as it is differently from every other body according to criteria that can be defined and changed over time. What is at stake is not only the principle of equality but also an entire series of distinctions or oppositions on which the conception of modern politics is based and from which democracy is generated: the distinctions between public and private, artificial and natural, and law *[diritto]* and theology. This is because at the moment when the body substitutes or "restores" *[riempie]* the abstract subjectivity of the juridical person it becomes difficult if not impossible to distinguish the concerns of the public sphere from the private as well as what belongs to the natural order and what can be subjected to the intervention of technology *[tecnica]*, with all of the ethical as well as religious questions that this kind of choice raises.

The reason for the indistinction and unresolvable contrasts that inevitably result is that human life is precisely the space in which public and private, natural and artificial, and the political and theological are entwined

to such a degree that no decision of the majority can undo it. This is why biopolitics is incompatible with the conceptual lexicon of democracy. Contrary to what we might think, the onset of life into *dispositifs* of power marks the eclipse of democracy, at least democracy as we have imagined it up until now. Of course, this does not mean that another kind of democracy is not imaginable, one that is compatible with the biopolitical shift underway, a shift, we should add, that cannot be reversed. How do we look for and how do we think about a biopolitical democracy or a democratic biopolitics, one that is capable of being used not on bodies but in favor of bodies? These questions are difficult to answer. At present we can glimpse only the outlines of possible responses. What is certain, however, is that to begin thinking in this direction all of the old philosophies of history and all the conceptual paradigms that refer to them must be dismantled *[disfarsi]*.

Notes

This essay was published originally in the journal Critical Inquiry *34 (2008): 633–44.*

1. See Augusto Del Noce, *L'Interpretazione transpolitica della storia contemporanea* (Naples: Guida, 1982).
2. See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1957; New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973); and Jacob Leib Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1952).
3. See François Furet, *Revolutionary France, 1770–1880*, trans. Antonia Nevill (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), and *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, trans. Deborah Furet (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
4. See Raymond Aron, *L'Opium des intellectuels* (1955; Paris: Editions Pluriel, 2002); *Democracy and Totalitarianism: A Theory of Political Systems*, ed. Roy Pierce (1968; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990); and *Power, Modernity, and Sociology: Selected Sociological Writings*, trans. Peter Morris, ed. Dominique Schnapper (Brookfield, VT: Gower, 1988).
5. See Marcel Gauchet and Gladys Swain, *Madness and Democracy: The Modern Psychiatric Universe*, trans. Catherine Porter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); *La Révolution des pouvoirs: La Souveraineté, le peuple, et la représentation, 1789–1799* (Paris: Gallimard, 1995); and *La Révolution des droits de l'homme* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989); and Claude Lefort, *Writing: The Political Test*, trans. David Ames Curtis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); and *La Complication: Retour sur le communisme* (Paris: Fayard, 1999).
6. Esposito here is referring to Foucault's discussion of biopolitics as it appears in the seminar from 1975–76 entitled *"Society Must Be Defended."* Recall that for Foucault, biopolitics names a technology of power that is to be distinguished from the mechanisms of discipline that emerge at the end of the eighteenth century. This new configuration of power aims to take "control of life and the biological processes of man-as-species and of ensuring that they are not disciplined, but regularized." The biopolitical apparatus includes "forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall mea-

sures. . . . In a word, security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life." As such, biopolitics is juxtaposed in Foucault's analysis to sovereignty, leading to the important distinction between them: "It is the power to make live. Sovereignty took life and let live. And now we have the emergence of a power that I would call the power of regularization, and it, in contrast, consists in making live and letting die." Biopolitics thus is that which guarantees the continuous living of the human species. Michel Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, trans. David Macey, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana (New York: Picador, 2003), 246–47). [Translator's note.]

7. See Ernst Nolte, *Der europäische Bürgerkrieg, 1917–1945: Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus* (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 1987).
8. See Emmanuel Levinas, "Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism," trans. Seán Hand, *Critical Inquiry* 17 (Autumn 1990): 62–71.
9. Esposito is drawing on the distinction in Greek between *zoē* and *bios* as employed most famously by Giorgio Agamben in *Homo Sacer*. Agamben writes: "The Greeks had no single term to express what we mean by the word 'life.' They used two terms that, although traceable to a common etymological root, are semantically and morphologically distinct: *zoē*, which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods), and *bios*, which indicated the form or way of life proper to an individual or group." Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1. [Translator's note.]
10. See Carl Schmitt, *Die geistesgeschictliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus* (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1923).
11. See Roberto Esposito, *Terza persona: Politica della vita e filosofia dell'impersonale* (Turin: Einaudi, 2007).